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Informal prisoner governance in Latin American penal institutions raises a number 
of dilemmas for policy. The responses must encompass decarceration and 
diversion policies, and an approach to prison security that emphasises co-
production and co-governance rather than coercive control. 
 
Survival and rent, monopoly and competition 
 
The roots of both survival-oriented informal prisoner governance and violent, rent-
oriented prisoner groups lie in the policies of mass incarceration adopted in the 
region from the 1980s, and consequent state omission and institutional violence. 
However, these policies have produced quite distinct experiences for prisoners and 
problems for the state. The articles in this special edition demonstrate a spectrum, 
differentiated by a combination of variables. These include: (1) the level of 
autonomy of the prisoners, collectively, from the prison authorities; (2) who 
exercises coercive control and violence, even lethal force, within the prison walls; 
(3) the degree of structure, hierarchical organisation and reach of prisoner 
organisations (whether they are monopolistic or competitive within a single facility, 
networked across several facilities in the prison system, or operational outside the 
prisons as well as within); and, finally, (4) the material resources (goods brought 
into the prison, or necessities inherent to imprisonment) that can be traded or used 
to extract rents and encourage loyalty and immaterial resources (legitimacy, trust 
or fear) available to such prisoner syndicates, enabling them to maintain 
dominance in relation both to the prisoners and to the prison authorities.  
 
All but the most draconian prison regimes require some degree of collaboration 
and communication between staff and inmates to maintain routines, predictability 
and the safety of both.1 However, a tipping point occurred in the early 1990s in 
Latin America with rising prisoner populations outstripped the authorities’ capacity 
to provide even the most minimal living standards, resulting in the state retreating 
to the perimeter of many prisons, and leaving inmates to fend for themselves. The 
self-governing prisoner communities that emerged for the purposes of day-to-day 
survival saw individuals and groups trading in the supply and distribution of 
                                                 
1
 This becomes even more necessary in conditions of scarcity of staff and of basic amenities as 
Postema et al describe in Lurigancho prison in Peru (this volume) and Darke shows in his study of a 
police lock-up in Rio de Janeiro. Darke, S. (2013) ‘Inmate governance in Brazilian prisons’ Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice 52 (3): 272-284. 
desperately needed goods, with the rules of this prison society upheld through 
constant reciprocity, trade and contract-like arrangements, and by prisoner 
disciplinary committees.2 Whilst a response to state neglect, the informal 
monetisation of everything produced by internal markets also tended to stimulate 
the creation of social hierarchies on the basis of income, with the community 
imposing segregation on stigmatised groups such as sex offenders.3  
 
More commonly, however, the supply of survival goods within an overcrowded 
prison was regulated not by monetary exchange, but by violence exerted by a 
dominant group or groups functioning as a rent-seeking protection racket, 
extracting taxes from the prisoners, and monopolising force.4 This monopoly was 
often unstable, and periodically rival groups or ‘strong men’ attempted to capture 
the commanding positions. This competition led to a volatile and terrifying 
environment for ordinary inmates. Mass incarceration policies also caused an influx 
of younger prisoners, often held for short periods on remand, with no knowledge of 
the ‘convict code’, which upset the previous equilibrium between guards and 
inmates, and caused a surge in interpersonal violence. The number of riots and 
murders rose steadily from 1990 to 2000 in Brazil’s prisons.5 The state’s response 
was brutal, epitomised by the police killing of 111 prisoners during a disturbance in 
the House of Detention in Carandiru. This, and other mass prison deaths, in the 
region, signalled to prisoners that they had no option but to organise to protect 
themselves from the violence both of the state and of their fellow inmates. The 
Carandiru massacre prompted, and legitimised, the emergence in 1993 of the 
Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a prisoner syndicate that came to control 
over 90 per cent of the prisons and prisoners in São Paulo state through its 
deployment first of violence then of a form of diffuse and collective responsibility.  
 
The PCC lies at the centralised end of the prisoner self-governance spectrum. 
Born within the prison system, it metamorphosed into a hegemonic and 
bureaucratic organisation with a codified ethos, stratified membership and a 
pseudo-legal disciplinary system,6 that was able to extend its activities and power 
beyond the prison walls, acquiring a dominant presence as an organised crime 
cartel in many low-income urban communities. By providing survival goods to the 
mass of inmates, it assured its own survival as an organised crime syndicate, 
racketeering both inside and outside the prison, for which their governance of the 
carceral space is key. Unlike territories (carceral or non-carceral) where there are 
two or more gangs engaged in violent turf-warfare, the PCC imposed a ‘pax 
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 San Pedro prison in Bolivia lies at the decentralised end of the informal self-governance spectrum, 
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monopolista’,7 regulating the use of violence by its members and those under its 
purview precisely because of the regular traffic between neighbourhoods and 
prison where it operated, and thus allegedly reducing the homicide rates in both. 
Other structured criminal groups, such as the comandos in Rio de Janeiro and the 
MS13 and the Barrio 18 gangs in El Salvador and Honduras.8 moved in the 
opposite direction, from the streets into the prisons through widespread arrest and 
incarceration. They may exert monopolies inside individual prisons that the 
authorities have segregated by gang, but are not hegemonic throughout the 




Carceral self-rule, in its different stages and dynamics, has been produced by the 
state, either through commission, in its penal policies, or omission, in its poor 
governance. Mass incarceration has provided a ready constituency of prisoners 
desperate for their basic survival and personal security needs to be met, and from 
whom rents can be extracted by dominant inmate groups. Specific penal policies, 
such as those targeting ‘gang members’ or drug dealers/users, ended up 
strengthening originally rather weak collective identities or affiliation through 
incarceration and group segregation, giving organised crime groups a territorial 
base. Prisoner syndicates may operate as a parallel power in the physical absence 
of the state authorities inside the jails but they are also engaged in a ‘deadly 
symbiosis’ with legal/coercive actors reliant on them to control violence inside and 
outside the prisons, and thus shore up state legitimacy.9 The São Paulo authorities 
have claimed credit for the drop in prison violence and homicides in PCC-
influenced areas.10 Similarly, the 2012 gang truce between the government and the 
maras in El Salvador was brokered from behind prison walls and resulted in a 
dramatic, albeit temporary, fall in murders.11 Yet, the government’s credit-claiming 
was ambivalent for it was simultaneously an admission of the state’s inability to 
provide law and order. Overall, the state’s ceding of the prisons and other areas is 
toxic to its legitimacy and ability to hold a monopoly on force as a key component 
of the rule of law. It is perhaps this paradox that often paralyses what might be 
sensible policies for reducing the need for survival-oriented prisoner self-
governance, and thus the opportunities for rent-seeking prisoner syndicates.  
 
Policy responses to date have largely consisted of denial and co-existence 
because the periodic outbreaks of violence within the jails with competing prisoner 
groups, or outside the jails, where monopolistic groups project their coercive and 
economic muscle, invite media attention and engender public insecurity. Two key 
policy area that would address the more negative aspects of ‘prisoner capture’ of 
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the carceral space are (1) the ratio of state resources to inmates, which involves 
both the supply side – how many prisoners are coming into the system - and the 
allocation of state resources, how much and to what purpose? (2) control and 
security issues, which includes issues such as the size of prisons, their architecture 
and regime. These in combination produce a high or low level of governance, and 
thus of legitimacy, for the state in relation to the prison system.  
 
The PCC slogan ‘peace, justice, liberty and equality’ summarises the intangible 
rule-of-law goods denied to the carceral mass by the state, and which lead to 
prisoner self-rule. Therefore, the obvious policy approach to reduce rent-seeking 
prisoner organisations is for the state to provide these and survival goods so that 
prisoners do not have to turn to inmate groups. However, logical that may seem, 
Latin American penal policy is underpinned, at local and national levels by a variety 
of overarching, and often political, not criminological, goals and underlying ethos. 
Modern prison systems claim to meet four objectives: incapacitation of the 
offender, deterrence of potential future offenders, legally-based punishment of a 
proven offence through the deprivation of liberty, and prevention of reoffending 
through education, job training, and psychological and family support. But in reality 
political, ideological and financial considerations prioritise some over others. These 
tensions are evident in the mixed successes of the key policies discussed below. 
 
Decarceration, diversion and dejudicialisation 
 
Informal prisoner governance results from extreme overcrowding and 
overstretched administrative capacity due to incarceration as a default penal 
response. Criminal laws are often inflexible and externally influenced: the United 
States, the major bilateral donor in the region, made mandatory remand and 
custodial sentences one of the conditions of its funding to countries such as 
Colombia, Bolivia and Mexico in its ‘Wars’ on drugs and organised crime.12 One in 
five prisoners in Latin America is currently held on a drugs charge. This has partly 
sustained the excessive - and often illegal and unjustifiable - use of remand which 
is causally correlated with prison corruption, the use of torture, the spread of 
disease, poverty for detainees’ families, and an undermining of the legitimacy of 
the criminal justice system, all of which lead ordinary inmates to place their trust 
and reliance in one another or informal prisoner organisations.13 Therefore, a key 
strategic response should be a determined reduction in the prison population, 
thereby draining the pool of new recruits or taxable inmates available to coercive 
rent-seeking prisoner organisations and freeing up resources to improve prison 
governance and enable inmate to thrive, not just survive.  
 
By the end of 2014 Brazil had over 622,000 prisoners, some 40 per cent of whom 
were on remand and waiting on average three months to see a trial judge. Many 
will be acquitted, or receive a non-custodial sentence in the end. Whilst there is no 
straightforward correlation between levels of pretrial detention and informal 
prisoner governance, as the quality of governance and the sheer size of 
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overloaded detention facilities are also determining factors,14 the revolving door of 
arrest, detention and release sends around one million individuals through the 
Brazilian prison system every year and into the arms of predatory prisoner 
groups.15 Slashing pretrial detention would free up resources (prison places, 
budgets for guards and services) for better governance of smaller prisons 
dedicated to serious offenders (convicted and remand), and avoid these harms.16 
International organisations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Open Society Justice Initiative have thus urged countries to 
implement custody hearings requiring suspects to be brought quickly before a 
judge (typically between 24 hours and a week) to determine the necessity of 
pretrial detention.  
 
If prison authorities generally welcome a reduced flow of new inmates into the 
system (assuming they are not extracting rents from them), they are frequently 
hindered by other branches of government: the legislature and judiciary.17 
Decarceration policies also founder on governance deficits, popular discourses on 
crime and in the discretionary sentencing practices and attitudes of judges, which 
end up denying the due ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ before the law, access to ‘justice’ and 
‘peace’ (security) that the PCC promises to its members in substitution of the state. 
States in the region have introduced alternatives to remand such as electronic 
tagging, house arrest, regular reporting to a police station, and a home-based 
curfew, as well as diversionary programmes, such as drug courts that would send 
small-time users to therapy rather than to prison. Non-custodial sentences such as 
community services and fines have been introduced for less serious crimes. But 
their effectiveness depends on governance capacity. Lack of adequate 
infrastructure and funding for penal alternatives, and ambiguities in the wording of 
laws, which leave them open to interpretation (for example, as to what a ‘serious’ 
crime is, whether an individual poses a ‘risk’, or what quantity of narcotics would be 
for ‘personal use’), mean that judges default default to the higher, rather than 
lower, levels of control. They are also influenced both by moral panics and penal 
punitivism in regards to socially marginalised populations – young, poor black men, 
or indigenous people – and a professional culture that neglects prisoners’ rights. 
Between 2008-2016 volunteer lawyers from Brazil’s National Justice Council, 
which oversees the country’s judges, reviewed 400,000 prisoner case files across 
Brazil, granting 80,000 benefits to which the prisoners were already entitled and 
freeing 45,000 detainees with spend sentences, but still in custody.18 These rights 
should have been guaranteed by local circuit judges tasked with overseeing 
prisoners’ sentences. With increasing criticism of the judicialisation of social 
relations and politics in the region, perhaps some aspects of the penal system, 
specifically post-sentencing, should be de-judicialised, a controversial proposal in a 
civil law system. 
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Security, securitisation and super-max 
 
A second policy challenge is how the state regains control of carceral spaces 
governed informally by substitutive, monopolistic groups. The Ecuadorian 
experience suggests a combination of transferring inmates to new prisons, 
removing all the sources of the group’s rents, supplying basic survival goods and 
maintaining a differentiated control unit elsewhere to isolate ringleaders.19 But 
again, it faltered on governance problems, viz. the state’s commitment to its own 
plan and an entrenched culture corruption among guards and police.  
 
A more serious challenge is containment, especially of the ringleaders of predatory 
prisoner groups that project power throughout and outside the prison system. In 
Latin America, despite the porosity of the system and clear lack of state control in 
many units, prisons are still often seen as part of the state’s security apparatus, 
and thus fall under the aegis of the ministries of internal affairs, public security, 
police or government. But securitisation of prisons is not new: super-maximum 
security regimes or facilities (geographically isolated fortress prisons, individual 
cells and very little association) existed since the nineteenth century. Indeed, 
another motive in the formation of the PCC was the experience of torture and 
illtreatment by ‘disruptive’ prisoners who were transferred to the rigid and abusive 
Taubaté disciplinary unit. Yet the state had no other tools with which to contain 
PCC leaders other than the regime that had fuelled the original grievance and 
collective action. When the PCC flexed its muscle by coordinating rioting in 29 
prison units in 2001, the prison authorities in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and then at 
federal level created a Differentiated Disciplinary regime.20 The PCC made it clear 
in its second ‘mega-riot’ in 2006 that it would resist transfer either to the federal 
units, or any other super-max facility. Conversely, transfers of leaders within the 
state prison system, or across state boundaries, seem to have facilitated the 
rhizomic spread of the PCC to other states in Brazil.21 The more horizontal and co-
operative the structure and culture of the inmate organisation, the more multipliers 
it has. Fluid positions within the group, a broad base of shared identity and norms 
among a large social class, combined with frequent prisoner release and re-
imprisonment, will propagate rent-seeking inmate groups and prison-based 
gangs.22 
 
However, prisons have to provide security not just for state and society in relation 
to violent offenders, but for all inmates under their purview. Again, policies have 
contradictory outcomes. Segregating competitive gangs in their own units, as in El 
Salvador, Honduras and Rio de Janeiro, will reduce immediate prison violence for 
the detainees swept up in that logic, but it does not remove the underlying threat of 
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violence implied in the gangs control of the unit. It also strengthens the groups’ 
cohesion, providing them with a territorial base for power projection. Countries 
across the region are now reaching for imported control solutions. The US ‘super-
max’ model has been vigorously promoted both by private sector security providers 
that have moved into prison management, and by the US government, particularly 
where it has leverage over countries through large-scale security sector financing 
(Plan Colombia, and Plan Mérida in Mexico).23 New , ‘everyday’ maximum security 
prisons are also now incorporating as a matter of course recognisable super-max 
architectural features such as remote surveillance and electronic control. They tend 
not to have riots and disturbances, although this is not because they are run by the 
private sector or in public-private-partnerships, but rather because the contracts 
preclude any level of overcrowding, and often require a level of governance and 
service provision far beyond that required of state-run prisons. But they are 
criticised for being dehumanising, and focussing on control rather than on 
rehabilitation. Whilst they may reduce disruptive prison association, they also 
effectively preclude more positive prisoner association. In the absence of dialogue 
with the authorities, collective co-governance is impossible and prisoners are 
reduced to deploying everyday forms of resistance through a myriad micro-
transgressions.24  
 
Co-production and co-governance 
 
The biggest challenge for any inmate, anywhere, is how to survive prison. For 
those in well-ordered and controlled prisons, this consists in ‘doing time,’ dealing 
with mind-numbering routines, maintaining one’s sense of self, and navigating the 
institutional rules, whether consistently applied, or capriciously set aside by staff. 
However, in many of Latin America’s prisons prisoners and staff are mutually 
dependent for physical, not just psychological, survival.25 Encouraging a structured 
form of co-governance would be a pragmatic response that recognises the 
complex and dense human relations that characterise most prisons, and which 
form the bedrock of successful management, order maintenance and rehabilitative 
approaches. 
 
Formalised forms of co-operation between prisoners and prison authorities are not 
new, and in Latin America existed in the mid-twentieth century heyday of large, 
model, high security prisons. In Brazil the system of ‘trustee’ prisoners and block 
and cell committees was overturned in the 1990s by a more repressive view of 
prison management.26 A return to structured co-governance seems a better 
guarantee for the core aims of the prison system, as well as for fundamental 
human rights protection, and in some of the carceral spaces abandoned by the 
state, non-governmental and religious groups have experimented with more 
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democratic relations with prisoners. In the so-called APAC units (generally run by 
Catholic voluntary groups on their own or in partnership with the state) and the 
Resocialisation Centres (run by a variety of NGOs and the state in São Paulo), 
inmates were collectively and individually made co-producers of their own personal 
transformation.27 These small, local prisons are successful by many measures: 
cheaper to run than state and privatised prisons, human rights compliant, devoid of 
violence and disturbance, and embedded positively in the local community. Yet 
they have remained marginal because often the higher echelons of prison 
management are dominated by a militarised view of the prison-as-barracks, in 
which obedience to rules and repressive responses to infractions are seen as key 
to order. As noted above, this tends to backfire and result in prisoner resistance 
and self-rule.  
 
Both prison management and offender re-integration can be achieved, but state 
must both relinquish its fantasies of complete control of the prison environment, 
and fulfil its constitutional and international legal responsibilities to those it 
incarcerates. If the state is to successfully prevent rent-seeking by coercive inmate 
groups or corrupt staff, and gain the trust and collaboration of survival-oriented 
prisoner governing groups, it also needs to re-establish legitimacy. This would 
include reduction of the prison population to manageable levels to avoid 
destabilising co-governance through overcrowding pressures, proper separation of 
categories of prisoners (whether by seriousness of crime, propensity for 
rehabilitation, stage or sentence or other criteria), meeting prisoners’ survival and 
rule-of-law needs, and ensuring effective external oversight of prison management. 
These conditions should make it feasible for prison staff to engage with detainees 
in some form of sustainable co-operative co-governance, albeit a necessarily 
asymmetrical one, that would humanise and protect the human rights of both, 
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